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Police Recruiting Campaign Approved on Military Bases

Defense Department plans to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in filling thousands of vacancies in state, county and city police departments. The Department of the Army has been designated executive agent.

In a test program now underway, representatives from the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department have been invited to visit military bases to interview men who will be leaving the service. The department has about 380 vacancies.

Normally, Defense Department policy does not allow such interviews, but an exception is being made because this is an experimental program, according to Alfred B. Fitt, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower).

The Defense Department anticipates other law enforcement agencies will participate in the recruiting program to fill the more than 15,000 vacancies throughout the country.

The Department of Defense is also cooperating with police departments in DOD's Project Transition, a program to help men leaving the service find jobs and adjust to civilian life.

Under the program, the city of Los Angeles has prepared a training program for in-service preparation of law enforcement officers, and other police departments are providing professional advice, technical assistance and job offers.

DOD Seeks Extension of Storage Time For Goods of Missing-in-Action Men

Department of Defense has asked Congress to extend the expense-free storage period for household goods for missing-in-action (MIA) personnel from the present six months maximum to a full year.

A DOD witness told a House Armed Service Subcommittee in mid-November that a 180-day period is clearly insufficient because the status of the sponsor places his dependents in state of mental stress and indecision. Families often live with relatives and set up light housekeeping, he said, until the MIA status is cleared up.

Current statutes permit dependents to store household goods free one year when the sponsor has been declared dead, and DOD's position is that a similar time period is necessary for MIA personnel.

'BRILLIANT SERVICE'—Lt. Gen. Richard L. Bohannon, Air Force Surgeon General, receives the Air Force Association Citation from Jess Larson, Air Force Association Board Chairman. Gen. Bohannon was cited for his "brilliant service" and for "his untiring devotion to the cause of expanded medical knowledge" while serving as Surgeon General from Dec. 1, 1963 to Nov. 30, 1967.

Defense Department Names Possible Sentinel Sites

The first 10 geographical areas to be surveyed as possible locations for the Sentinel system have been identified by the Department of Defense. They are:

Albany, Ga.; Chicago; Dallas; New York; Oahu, Hawaii; Salt Lake City; Seattle; Boston; Detroit and Grand Forks AFB, N. D.

The Sentinel system is the Communist China-oriented antiballistic system recently approved for deployment.

The Department of Defense said the potential areas which will be studied now are among those which will probably provide what was termed optimum locations for the area-defense weapons and their radars.

It also was pointed out that these areas are not final choices and that the list is not complete. In some cases, even the preliminary potential areas have not yet been determined. In most instances sites being considered are located on government-owned lands. Identification of other areas to be selected for detailed survey will be made later.

Gen. Westmoreland Gives Vietnam Progress Report

I would like to give you today a short progress report on some aspects of the war in Vietnam, because we in Vietnam are keenly aware of the genuine concern being expressed at home about the complex situation in that country.

The war in Vietnam eludes any precise numerical system of measurement or any easy portrayal of progress on battle maps. The war is unique and complicated in origin, in diversity of form, and in its diffusion throughout Vietnam. It is a war which probably could not have occurred in this pattern in any other country in these times. But, if we had not met it squarely, it well could have been the precedent for countless future wars of a similar nature.

I have been observing the war in South Vietnam at close hand for almost four years. During the first one and one-half years we were confined generally to an advisory role. In the past two and one-half years I have seen the progressive commitment of U.S. troops in support of the Vietnamese. I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing. There are indications that the Viet Cong and even Hanoi know this.

However, the enemy may be operating from the delusion that political pressure here combined with the tactical defeat of a major unit might force the U.S. to "throw in the towel." If he does not believe this, there is very little logic to be found in his continuing the war in its present pattern.

Enemy Hasn't Won Major Battle in Year

It is significant that the enemy has not won a major battle in more than a year. In general, he can fight his large forces only at the edges of his sanctuaries, as we have seen recently at Con Thien and along the DMZ, at Dak To opposite the Laotian border, at Song Be and Loc Ninh near the Cambodian border. His Viet Cong military units can no longer fill their ranks from the South but must depend increasingly on replacements from North Vietnam. His guerrilla force is declining at a steady rate. Morale problems are developing within his ranks.

Despite this, our enemy seeks to prolong the war, occasionally sallying forth from his sanctuaries, and attempting by his counter-sweep operations to regain control of the population and to rebuild his guerrilla forces. Of essential importance is his desire to force us politically to stop, unconditionally, the bombing of his support base and his lines of communication. He appears to believe that he can defeat the Vietnamese forces, over 600,000 strong and getting stronger, reinforced by over 50,000 troops from Free World Allies, and our commitment now approaching 500,000 men.

Our common plan with the Vietnamese has involved four distinct phases. In Phase I we came to the aid of South Vietnam, prevented its collapse under the massive Communist thrust, built up our bases and began to deploy our forces. In Phase I we planned and did the following:

Build ports, airfields, and supply and maintenance areas.

Set up a 10,000 mile long supply pipeline.

Constructed an extensive communication system.

Brought in 400,000 men and several thousand aircraft.

Deployed troops throughout South Vietnam.

Learned to work alongside the Vietnamese Army while encouraging development of a representative government.

Equipped and revitalized the Vietnamese armed forces whose morale was low.

Expanded the armed forces of South Vietnam in quantitative terms.

Defended South Vietnam against defeat and against being cut in half.

Learned to cope with guerrilla tactics.

Set up an intelligence system for this new type of war.

Limited inflation.

Developed our own confidence that we could operate successfully in the environments of Southeast Asia.

We did all this by the middle of 1966. It was a tribute to U.S. organization, technology, and concerted diplomatic and military professionalism by many people. At that point during the summer of 1966, we moved into the second phase of our plan. In Phase II we continued the pattern and did the following:

Drove the enemy divisions back to sanctuary or into hiding.

Trained, expanded and improved the quality of the Vietnamese armed forces.

Assisted Free World forces of the Pacific area to join the battle against Communist aggression.

Entered enemy base areas and destroyed his supplies.

Raised enemy losses beyond his input capability.

Helped train the Vietnamese Army as a territorial security force.

Encouraged combined U.S./Vietnamese operations.

Completed free elections within South Vietnam.

Saw an elected civilian government installed.

Stabilized prices—opening roads and canals.

Encouraged enemy defection and resettlement.

Discovered and thwarted the enemy's battle plans before they could be executed.

Unified the U.S. pacification assistance effort for better management of widespread resources.

Second Phase Complete This Year

We will complete this second phase by the end of this year. Before leaving my discussion of this phase, there is one other management aspect worthy of mention. Our rapid buildup 10,000 miles away in an undeveloped nation lacking in logistics support facilities has created many problems. Some units brought to Vietnam equipment that has not been needed. Some supplies were shipped automatically based on experience in other wars and have not been consumed in the quantities expected. At the same time, our magnificent fighting men have received what they needed to do their job. Now, at the end of this second phase, we have been able to intensify logistical management and turn our attention to eliminating any excess items which may have developed.

With 1968, a new phase is now starting. We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view. What is this third phase we are about to enter?

In Phase III, in 1968, we intend to do the following:

Help the Vietnamese armed forces to continue improving their effectiveness.

Decrease our advisors in training centers and other places

where the professional competence of Vietnamese officers makes this possible.

Increase our advisory effort with the younger brothers of the Vietnamese Army: the Regional Forces and Popular Forces.

Use U.S. and Free World forces to destroy North Vietnamese forays while we assist the Vietnamese to reorganize for territorial security.

Provide the new military equipment to revitalize the Vietnamese Army, and prepare it to take on an ever-increasing share of the war.

Continue pressure on the North to prevent rebuilding and to make infiltration more costly.

Turn a major share of front line DMZ defense over to the Vietnamese Army.

Increase U.S. support in the rich and populated Delta.

Help the Government of Vietnam single out and destroy the Communist Shadow Government.

Continue to isolate the guerrilla from the people.

Help the new Vietnamese government to respond to popular aspirations, and to reduce and eliminate corruption.

Help the Vietnamese strengthen their police forces to enhance law and order.

Open more roads and canals.

Continue to improve the Vietnamese economy and standard of living.

Now for Phase IV—the final phase. That period will see the conclusion of our plan to weaken the enemy and strengthen our friends until *we* become progressively superfluous. The object will be to show the world that guerrilla warfare and invasion do not pay as a new means of Communist aggression.

Phase IV Forecast

I see Phase IV happening as follows:

Infiltration will slow.

The Communist infrastructure will be cut up and near collapse.

The Vietnamese government will prove its stability, and the Vietnamese Army will show that it can handle Viet Cong.

The Regional Forces and Popular Forces will reach a higher level of professional performance.

U.S. units can begin to phase down as the Vietnamese Army is modernized and develops its capacity to the fullest.

The military physical assets, bases and ports, will be progressively turned over to the Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese will take charge of the final mopping up of the Viet Cong (which will probably last several years).

The U.S., at the same time, will continue the developmental help envisaged by the President for the community of Southeast Asia.

You may ask how long Phase III will take, before we reach the final phase. We have already entered parts of Phase III. Looking back on Phases I and II we can conclude that we have come a long way.

I see progress as I travel all over Vietnam.

I see it in the attitudes of the Vietnamese.

I see it in the open roads and canals.

I see it in the new crops and the new purchasing power of the farmer.

I see it in the increased willingness of the Vietnamese Army to fight North Vietnamese units and in the victories they are winning.

Parenthetically, I might say that the U.S. press tends to report U.S. actions; so you may not be as aware as I am of the victories won by South Vietnamese forces.

The enemy has many problems:

He is losing control of the scattered population under his influence.

He is losing credibility with the population he still controls.

He is alienating the people by his increased demands and taxes where he can impose them.

He sees the strength of his forces steadily declining.

He can no longer recruit in the South to any meaningful extent; he must plug the gap with North Vietnamese.

His monsoon offensives have been failures.

He was dealt a mortal blow by the installation of a freely elected representative government.

And he failed in his desperate effort to take the world's headlines from the Inauguration by a military victory.

Vietnamese Army Improving

Lastly, the Vietnamese Army is on the road to becoming a competent force. Korean troops in Vietnam provide a good example for the Vietnamese. Fifteen years ago the Koreans themselves had problems now ascribed to the Vietnamese. The Koreans surmounted these problems and so can and will the Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese Armed Forces have accomplished much in a short time. Here are a few examples:

Career management for officers, particularly infantry officers, has been instituted.

Sound promotion procedures have been put into effect.

Discipline and conduct is being stressed.

Increased emphasis is being devoted to small unit tactics and leadership.

The promotion of enlisted men to the commissioned ranks is now commonplace (2200 in 1966).

Officer Candidates must now take basic training and prove that they have the leadership potential to be officers.

An Inspector General for the Vietnamese Armed Forces has been appointed and is now active in detailed inspections.

Corrupt and inefficient officials are being gradually eliminated.

The military school system has been revitalized.

The Military Academy has gone to a four-year curriculum.

A school for Battalion Commanders has been established.

A ten-month National Defense College has been organized for selected senior officers.

The same personnel management programs which have been installed successfully in the Vietnamese Army are being expanded to the Regional Forces and Popular Forces.

We are making progress. We know you want an honorable and early transition to the fourth and last phase.

So do your sons and so do I.

It lies within our grasp—the enemy's hopes are bankrupt. With your support we will give you a success that will impact not only on South Vietnam, but on every emerging nation.

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* *Excerpts from a speech by General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. forces in Vietnam, at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., Nov. 21.*

DOD Cuts Operations Of 17 More Cargo Ships

Defense Department is placing 17 more cargo ships on "reduced operating status."

The ships have been carrying cargo to Southeast Asia for the Defense Department and the Agency for International Development. Pending further action, the ships will remain idle at West Coast ports.

This is the second time this year that ships have been considered surplus to Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) requirements.

In August, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that 16 MSTS ships would be idled because of improved turn-around time at Southeast Asian ports.

Of these ships, Defense Department is now returning 15 to the National Defense Reserve Fleet for mothballing at West Coast ports.

Army Names Winner In TACFIRE Contest

Army's TACFIRE competition to better field artillery fire by automating current manual functions with a digital computer has been won by Data Systems Division of Litton Industries at Van Nuys, Calif.

The Tactical Fire Direction System, or TACFIRE by its more familiar short title, is designed to make significant improvements in response time and accuracy.

Army described TACFIRE as part of its overall program to exploit data processing technologies and subminiature electronics.

"This procurement is of particularly significance because it is the first major Army project to undergo contract definition in which the ensuing procurement is to be placed on contract using the total package procurement concept," the Army said in its Nov. 8 announcement.

Army said it anticipated that the contract will be awarded to Litton Industries in the near future.

ENEMY WEAPONS INSPECTION— Army Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Koster, Commanding General, Americal Division (left), and Lt. Col. Norman L. Tiller, Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, examine an RPG-7 captured by Col. Tiller's unit in Vietnam. The weapon is the first of its type to be captured by a unit of the Americal Division.

Overseas Dep. Schools Begin Teacher Drive

The Overseas Dependent School System began in mid-November its annual teacher recruiting drive for next year, looking for the usual 1,500 yearly quota to fill vacancies in the ranks of some 6,800 teachers.

Department of Defense said the jobs are located at some 300 schools in 28 countries, wherever military men and civilian employees take their families, including Germany, England, Japan and the Philippines.

Starting pay for teachers with a Bachelor's degree, teaching certificate and two years experience is $5,800 annually, exclusive of free housing or housing allowance plus free transportation, DOD said.

DOD uses the United States Employment Service for this recruiting effort, and interested persons may contact anyone of the 100 local USES offices nearest them for full particulars.

Army Drill Sgt. Classes Have 3,000 Vacancies

A streamlined drill sergeant course, designed to give drill corporals the opportunity to become drill sergeants in only three weeks, has been introduced at Ft. Jackson, S.C. Recent surveys show approximately 3,000 of the 9,066 openings are unfilled.

The course is intended to help fill the need for drill sergeants at the 16 Army training centers. The new classes will be conducted at all drill sergeant schools in the continental United States.

The 132-hour course includes instruction in recruit handling, effective military instruction, rifle marksmanship, dismounted drill, physical training, leadership, inspection and general review.

Wash-and-Wear Uniform Slated for Army Testing

A new wash-and-wear summer uniform will be tested next year by Army and may be available for optional purchase by officer and enlisted personnel by summer 1969.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Harold K. Johnson already has approved the Army Uniform Board's recommendation for a short-sleeve shirt and trouser combination in a khaki polyester and rayon fiber.

Army plans to run a test on the new uniform next summer among drill sergeants. If test results are favorable, Army will take final action to authorize the uniform and have it available in PX and commercial outlets by summer 1969.

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